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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JANE LARAWAY MILLER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 8862

ORRIN TOWLER MILLER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the appellant's statement of facts is basically correct, there are certain omissions which of necessity must be called to the attention of the Court. In
actuality, the defendant did not "lose everything," as
alleged in appellant's brief. As shown in the Decision
of the Court, Rendered January 4, 1957, by the Honorable
Judge Joseph G. Jeppson (R. 2), there were other assets
possessed by the parties, viz: an automobile, and certain
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funds that had been on deposit in the Credit Union, which
were withdrawn by the defendant and delivered by him
to his mother and brother, in what the ·Court may have
considered as an effort to conceal them. The Court was
convinced that the defendant still owned and had effective
control over the funds (R. 2), and determined that the
parties had a total of $13,490.00 to be divided (R~
Supplemental Filing). Of this amount, $5,067.00 was
impressed by the Court with a lien to be used for the
payment of alimony in the amount of $75.00 per month
for a period of twenty-four months, and for support
money in the amount of $60.00 per month. Thus, it is
obvious that the defendant still had substantial assets and
did not lose everything. The intent of the Court was to
leave the defendant's salary free from any charges for
alimony or support money and to ensure the payment
of same.
The defendant has frequently and bitterly complained of this decree, but it 1nust be pointed out that the
Court, in rendering its decree, had before it both the
plaintiff and the defendant and had opportunity, over
the period of the trial, which extended over a period of
two days, to observe the attitudes of the parties, and the
Order and Decree, as issued, was not made without full
justification.
It must be further pointed out that the defendant
had his remedy by appeal, but no appeal was filed from
this decision. Defendant has, at times, throughout this
proceeding, appeared as his own attorney, but he has also
been adequately represented by able counsel, as an ex-
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arnination of the record will disclose. Instead of appeal
to the Supreme Court, defendant has sought by various
motions to have other judges of the District Court set
aside and reverse the decision of Judge Jeppson.
A Motion for Amendment of Decree was made by
the defendant December 28, 1956 (R. 4). This Motion
was filed in behalf of defendant by Keith R. Schofield,
Esq. It was heard and denied by the Court January 17,
1957. A second Motion for Amendment was filed on
September 16, 1957, on behalf of defendant by Elias
L. Day, Esq. This was heard by the Honorable Alden J.
Anderson in October, 1957, and the defendant's motion
to reduce the amount of support· money from $60.00 per
month to $45.00 per month and to remove the lien from
the savings account was again denied. A third motion,
to release the funds in the savings account for the use of
the defendant, was filed January 15, 1958, by James E.
Faust, Esq., as attorney for the defendant. At the time
this motion came up for hearing an effort was made to
settle the controversy and terminate the litigation which
had consumed so much time and effort and caused so
much distress over the past year and a half. As a result
of the negotiations in the court room of the Honorable
Judge Stewart M. Hansen (R. 1-5, Supplemental File),
a stipulation was entered into, in open court, whereby
the defendant, in order to free himself of any further
obligation to support his child, and thereby obtain the
release of the balance of the funds on deposit in the savings account, agreed to the adoption of his daughter by
the plaintiff's husband, Samuel Clyde Kemp, and in open
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court, before Judge ·Hansen, ·the defendant signed the
Consent to Adoption, which was then filed in the adoption proceedings, Probate No. 40721, in the Third District Court' in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
By the stipulation referred to above, the impressed
funds on deposit in The Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan, were released to defendant and he withdrew those
funds, in excess of $5,000.00. He presently retains these
funds and has made no offer to replace them. In addition,
by the terms of the stipulation, plaintiff was to reimburse
defendant in the sum of $160.00 for attorneys fees paid by
defendant to his attorney, James E. Faust. This sum
was remitted to (R. 22) and received by defendant and
has been retained by him.
Immediately after accomplishing his primary purpose of removing the lien from the savings account and
acquiring control of the impressed funds, the defendant,
without offering to restore any benefits received by him
through the stipulation, next sought to relieve himself of
his obligation under the terms of the stipulation, that of
permitting the plaintiff's husband to adopt the child.
Prior to obtaining the 1noney, he willingly signed, after
.being duly apprised of his parental rights and the legal
.consequences, before Judge Hansen, the Consent to Adoption. It was after he had obtained control of the funds
t hnt he filed, in the divorce proceedings, a Motion for
\Vithdrawal of Consent to Adoption. Tins 1notion was
denied by Judge Hansen, before whon1 the stipulation
had been entered into, and fron1 this order of denial this
appeal has been filed.
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STATEMENT OF POINT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING TO
DEFENDANT PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW HIS CONSENT FOR ADOPTION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A. DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN CONSENT WAS GIVEN
IN OPEN COURT AS PROVIDED BY SE.CTION 78-30-8, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
B.

DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN 'CONSENT WAS GIVEN
TO CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT.

C. DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO ADOPTION WAS
GIVEN IN CONSIDERATION OF AN ORDER AND DECREE
OF COURT AND THE DEFENDANT HAS RETAINED AND
NOT TENDERED BA·CK THE BENEFITS GRANTED TO
HIM BY SUCH ORDER AND DECREE.
D. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILD
WILL BE SERVED BY PERMITTING THE CONSENT OF
ADOPTION TO STAND AND THE ADOPTION TO BE FULLY
CONSUMATED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING TO
DEFENDANT PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW HIS CONSENT FOR ADOPTION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A. DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN CONSENT WAS GIVEN
IN OPEN COURT AS PROVIDED BY SE.CTION 78-30-8, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
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The human mind is so constituted that it is not unusual for a person to change his mind; to reverse a previous decision and follow a new course of action. Within
certain limits this is necessary, proper, and even desirable. But there comes a point where that is neither desirable nor proper. Frequently persons who enter into a
contract have a change of heart and would like to be relieved of the obligations thereof; but after the contract
has been entered into and commitments made by both
parties, there is no backing out, and proper contracts
will be enforced by a decree of specific performance.
Quite often, persons marry, and to borrow the language
from appellant's brief, "immediately realize the serious
consequences of the thing they have done," and wish to
repent of the marriage covenant and earnestly and sincerely desire to recant that which has been done; but once
the marriage vow has been pronounced there can be no
withdrawal of consent.
So, also, in the matter of adoptions, there comes a
point where consent, once given, is, and should be, final
and irrevocable, not only out of fairness to the parties
already conunitted, but also out of consideration to the
r.hild and itf' future; that it n1ight look forward to a stable,
seeure home which is not beset with the uncertainties,
whimf', and caprice of vacilating human emotions and
dP<'iHions. Associate Justice ~filler of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in In ReAdoption of a
Min or, 79 U.S. App. D.C. 191, 1+! F. 2d 644, 648, stated
in for<'Pfullanguage as follows:
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"It is apparent that if in particular cases the
unstable whims and fancies of natural mothers
(fathers) were permitted, first, to put in motion
all the flow of parental love and expenditure of
time, energy and money which is involved in adoption, and then as casually put the whole process
in reverse, the major purpose of the statute would
be largely defeated. Doctors of medicine and of
divinity, potential adoptive parents, and social
workers would be stymied in their rehabilitation
efforts. A premium would, instead, be put upon
the emotional instability which produces illegiti. mates; to say nothing of the possibilities for
racketeering which such an interpretatiton of the
law would put in reach of those who may be criminal in their tendencies as well as lacking in the
qualities of parenthood."
Once written consent has been given, in open court,
and in the manner prescribed by law, the point of no return has been reached and consent cannot be withdrawn.
This is, as the appellant concedes, the modern rule. In
McRae v. Lamb, 233 S.W. 2d 193, the Texas Supreme
Court, in reviewing a prior rule, said :
"From an examination of the reported case it
seems that since the decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Wyness vs. Crowley,
1935, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E. 758, the rule which
does not permit an arbitrary withdrawal of consent has become the majority rule. This is indicated by the annotations appearing in 138 A.L.R.
1038 and 156 A.L.R. 1011, as well as the cases
appearing in the pocket parts of 2 C.J.S. Adoption
of·Children Sec. 21 (4), pg. 386."
For many years the law of Utah has required the
consent of the natural parents, but no particular form of
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consent was prescribed.· The 1953 Legislature amended
the law to add sanctity to the consent. No longer was a
:rp.ere consent before a notary public sufficient. The law,
as amended, was designed to make certain that the person
giving. the consent should be fully advised as to the legal
significance of his aet. The law, as amended, requires
the appearance of the consenting parent before the District Court, and where that cannot be done, then before
a commissioner especially appointed for the purpose. The
consent, under these circumstances, assumes the sanctity
and finality of the marriage vow and is, and should be
irrevocable.
That this is the intent and effect of the law is shown
in the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, where, In reAdoption of D ________ , 122 Utah
525, 252 P. 2d 223, 230, the Court said:
''No statutory provision specifically prohibits
a change of mind and revocation by a parent who
consents before a court. It is obviously unnecessary to so provide. These statutory provisions
which authorize that consent be given in the presence of and with the approval of the Court certainly contemplate that a consent so executed would
be valid and binding.··

n________,

In the Saine case. In re . .:\..doption of
supra,
the Court points out that when written surrender of n
child to any liePnsed child placing society or agency is
t'xecuted "the release to the agency is intended to be
final." Should a written surrender of custody to a child
placing agenc~· haYe any greater validity and finality
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than
a consent to adoption executed in open court b~fore.
a Judge~ The D ________ case again gives the answer:
'

.

"It would be anomalous indeed if, as the appellant contends, signing before an employee of
the agency would have greater sanctity than one
executed formally before the Court in the adoption
proceeding."
The defendant is an adult person in possession of all
of his faculties. The record indicates that he was well
apprised of his rights by Judge Hansen before he signed
the adoption consent. Certainly he was aware of all the
implications and rights involved. It has been suggested
that the action of the defendant in signing away his child
for a release of the lien on money impounded for the
child's benefit is akin to selling away the child. This
question was considered by the Supreme Court of New
Mexico in Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P. 2d 175,184. The parents
sold their child, which action the Court soundly condemned, but added :
"But denouncing the acts of the adults does
not settle the question of what happens to the
children. Can it be said that natural parents may
sell their children, enjoy the proceeds and then
come into Court and demand the return of their
children~ If so, what would there be in law to
prevent their selling the children over and over
again~ The answer is clear-the act of selling
children constitutes abandonment of them as a
matter of law. In fact, we can think of no more
drastic way in which children could be abandoned
unless it be simply to leave them alone and <'X~
posed to the elements."
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In the case now before the Court the statutory provisions for obtaining the consent of the father were meticulously followed, and the consent, once given, is irrevocabel, and certainly the defendant does not have the
right to withdraw his consent as a matter of law.
B. DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN CONSENT WAS GIVEN
PURSUANT TO CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT.

Because of the haphazard manner in which this proceeding has been handled, the record before the Court is
not as clear as it should be. As is evident from the second
paragraph of appellant's Statement of Case, pg. 1 of
Appelllant's Brief, defendant's motion to set aside the
consent was improperly numbered and filed in case No.
106986. To have been effective it should have been numbered and filed in the adoption proceeding. Respondent
was not required to and made no effort to present testimony in opposition to appellant's motion. All that respondent was required to do and all that she did do at
the hearing on the motion was to show its invalidity,
and the Court thereupon denied the motion (R. 20).
It will be noted that the motion of February 19, 1958,
on which the order was based from which defendant is
now appealing, 1nerely required the plaintiff to "appear
. . . within five days to show cause for breach." (R. 18).
The plaintiff appeared, showed that there was no breach,
and the Court denied the motion. No evidence was called
for as to the contract upon which defendant's consent was
based.
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Hence, there is no record of the underlying agreement which constituted the consideration for the execution of the consent to adoption, save and except the transcription of the stipulation, which was filed in the Supreme
Court on June 16, 1958. Nevertheless, it is conceded by
appellant that the release of the lien on the impressed
money (R. 19) and the payment of appellant's attorney
fee in the sum of $160.00, were "given in consideration of
defendant's signing a consent for Samuel Clyde Kemp
to adopt his (defendant's) child."
Now note the position in which the minor child will
be placed if defendant is permitted, in breach of his agreement, to withdraw his consent. Prior to the signing of
the consent for adoption and the release of the lien, the
child had the security of a home with its mother and
foster father, and also the security of a substantial sum
of money, impressed with a lien for the child's benefit.
After the signing of the consent and the release of the
lien on the funds the .child had lost the security of the
impounded money, but was in position to receive, instead,
the security of a home in which it would have a legal
right to support from the adopting father, including
rights of inheritance. This right the defendant would
deny his child if he is permitted to breach his agreement
and withdraw his consent.
That parents may bind themselves by contract to
permit the adoption of their children has been decided
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case
referred to above, In re Adoption of D ________ , supra, the
syllabus of which reads as follows:
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"Contracts for adoption, fairly and volun~
tarily entered into, are valid as between the parties, hut will not be enforced to the detriment of
the child. U.C.A. 1953, 55-8-2(c), 55-10-42, 78-304, 78-30-8."
This case merely followed a previous Utah decision
which has remained unchanged for almost half a century,
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 P. 423, in which the
Court decided:
"The great weight of authority however, sustains the position that a parent may by contract
legally transfer and surrender his infant child into
the custody of another where the interest of the
child is not prejudiced by the transaction."
Numerous authorities are then cited by the Court.
C. DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO ADOPTION WAS
GIVEN IN CONSIDERATION OF AN ORDER AND DECREE
OF COURT AND THE DEFENDANT HAS RETAINED AND
NOT TENDERED BACK THE BENEFITS GRANTED TO
HIM BY SUCH ORDER AND DECREE.

As hereinabove set forth. the consent to adoption
executed h~· the defendant was based upon the consideration of tlw release by the Court of the lien on the savings
account on deposit at Prudential Federal Savings and
Loan, and thr payn1ent by plaintiff to defendant of the
attornr~· fee incurred by hiln in the an1ount of $160.00.
The mon(l~· in the savings account was released upon
stipulation of C'e()unsel and order of court (R. 19). It is
:-\hown hY thP record (R. 20) that defendant had this
Htipulation in his possession at the tin1e he appeared in
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court on his motion to withdraw consent; denial of which
gave rise to this appeal. Defendant withdrew the funds
from the savings account. He received (R. 22) payment
of the attorneys fee. Thus, he has accepted and retained
all of the benefits granted to him by the stipulation and
~ourt order. Defendant has not tendered back the benefits which he received; nothing has been restored.
There is an ancient maxim in equity, "He that seeks
equity must do equity." This Court in In re Adoption of
D________ , supra, declared an adoption proceeding to be
"equitable in the highest degree." Certainly, upon equitable grounds the defendant is not entitled to the equitable
relief of being able to withdraw his consent to adoption.
But there is a further principle in this connection
which precludes granting to defendant the relief he seeks.
This ·Court has repeatedly held that where a party accepts the benefits of a decree he waives his right to appeal
and will not be heard to complain of those parts of the
judgment which he finds objectionable. Thus, in Cornia
v. Cornia, 80 Utah 486, 15 P. 2d 631, the appellants recognized the validity of a decree by accepting the benefits of
the same in their favor. The Court said:
"For these reasons they have waived their
right to appeal, and are estopped from claiming
the right to have the decree reviewed by this court.
The following cases and authorities will be found
to sustain the foregoing conclusions: 3 C.J. ()();),
Sec. 536; Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply,
56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 366, 274 P. 139;
.
Albright v. Oyster (C.C.A.) 60 F. 644."
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Mr. Miller: Yes.
The Court: And is it your desire at this time
to· sign this consent, consenting that the child
be adopted by your former wife's present husband
and herself~
Mr. Miller : I do.
The Court: And is anybody forcing you to
do

this~

Mr. Miller: No. I will make a statement what
the money i·s for if you would like to hear it.
The Court : You are doing this though of your
own free will and consent~
Mr. Miller: Yes.
It should also be noted that Mr. Miller was sworn
by the clerk of the eourt before he gave this testimony.
The defendant's interest in money, rather than his
child and her welfare, is further illustrated by defendant's
petition, through his attorney, Elias L. Day, on September 13, 1957, to have the order for child support reduced
fron1 $60.00 per Inonth to $45.00 per month (R. 8). This
was done in spite of the fact that shortly before that
time defendant's salary was increased from $400.00 per
Inonth to $525.00 per month (R. 10). In the face of this
overwhehning evidence showing defendant's callous,
materialistic behavior, towards his daughter, the appellant would have the Court believe that it was his love and
concern for the child's welfare that prompted him to
Ino~e to withdraw his consent to adoption. (Appellant's
Brief, page 12) "Certainly the child's welfare cannot be
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enhanced by depriving her -of this love, support, and
attention to which she· is entitled under the law." What
love~ What support, other than that ordered by the
Court and to which the defendant objected and moved
to reduce~ What attention from the defendant~ Who has
supported this child since defendant withdrew the funds
from impressed savings account in February of 1958 ~
For what it may be worth, as an indication of the
unstable nature and disposition of the defendant, respondent respectfully calls the Court's attention to the
fact that throughout the course of these proceedings the
defendant has deemed it necessary to change attorneys
at frequent intervals. In addition to other counsel with
whom defendant has discussed this matter, the record will
show the following attorneys to have appeared for defendant at various times:
Paul E. Reimann, who filed defendant's Answer.
Richards & Bird and Keith Schofield, who represented defendant at the trial.
Elias L. Day, who appeared on motion for amendment of decree.
James E. Faust, who appeared on a similar motion.
David E. West, who filed defendant's appeal brief.
The Court is aware of the ability and integrity of
these worthy members of the bar. Although appellant'::;
brief alleges in several places that defendant was without
legal counsel, it seems improbable that he suffered from
lack of legal assistance. Nevertheless, he has still found
it necessary to appear in his own behalf, without legal
counsel, at various times, and in particular at the time
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of ·preparaticm and presentation in court of· the motion
and order which is the subject of this appeal. At the
present time ,he- has discharged his legal counsel, Mr.
West, and- is again without counsel. One can only conchide from- this parade of legal counsel that the defend~
ant refuses to heed the advice of his attorneys, thereby
coJ!lpelling their withdrawal, or he changes his mind so
frequently ·as to be wholly unpredictable. His execution
of the adoption consent and then the professed immediate
repentence therefrom is further evidence of defendant's
instability.
The appellant, in his brief, asserts that there are no
"invested rights" in this case.
"In analyzing those cases which have deprived the natural parents the right to withdraw
a consent, it is particularly noted that they invariably involve a situation where the child has
been placed in a new home for a substantial period
of time and the bonds of affection have been
forged between the new parents and the child.
Under such circumstances, courts have been reluctant to uproot the child from its environment.
or to destroy a new parental relationship which
has arisen." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 9.)
Attention is called to the fact that the child has been
living. with the adopting father since his marriage to
the_plaintiff July 26, 1957, which is well over a year, and
certainly time enough for a strong parental attachment
and po:p.d to develop; and such relationship would surely
be destroyed if defendant were allowed to prevail in this
appeal. ,Mr. ICemp, the adopting father, is the only father
thi~ child has known, £or all practical purposes.
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What positive contributions to the welfare ·of this
ehild woUld be effected if defendant's appeal were de.:.
nied and the consent of adoption was to stand and the
adoption was to be fully consumated ~ Primarily, and of
greatest importance, she would have the security of a
real, full-time father who loved her and wanted her to
such an extent as to choose her to become his own daughter. Mr. Kemp, the adopting father, is the only real
father this child has known. She would have the security
of having the same name as her mother as well as her
new father. This is important to children. She would
be enveloped in the warmth of a stable; secure, mature
home and a peaceful, harmonious environment. She would
have not only the right to inherit from the defendant,
her natural father, but also to inherit from her adopted
father, Mr. Kemp. (See In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah
172, 166 P. 2d 257.)
If the defendant prevails in this appeal the child
will be caught up in the turmoil of divided loyalties motivated by possible sporadic visits from a stranger who
professes to be her father. The very real possibility,
yea probability, of open competition between natural
mother and natural father for the control of the child,
which often results in "parental bribery" of a child's
affections with utter disregard for sensible limits and
discipline and the child's well-being. A step-father without rights, even though he should be the one to exercise
and create the balance in a well adjusted home, because
of the necessity of having to compete with another man
for the loyalties and respect of his step-daughter. The
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confusion of bearing a name different from that of her
mother., The emotional upset of knowing that she doesn't
really "belong" anywhere. The tension of never knowing
when or where her natural father will appear to upset
the home once again. It seems impossible, as the District
Court records are examined revealing the strife and turmoil of the plaintiff's and defendant's marital relationships, and as the defendant's behavior in the past is reviewed as regarding his instability and lack of interest
in his child, to conceive of this child ever achieving a
normal, happy; stable and secure life if the defendant's
appeal is granted. It would be cruel to the child to subject her to the turmoils that are here evident.

CONCLUSION
This Court has held in In reAdoption of D ____ , supra,
'"The parents consent to adoption, once voluntarily given
and acted upon by adopting parents, cannot be withdrawn without good cause." It is respectfully submitted
that the appellant has not shown good cause for such
a withdrawal; that it would be for the best interests of
the minor child to be adopted, and that the Court should
affirn1 the order of the District Court denying defendant the right to withdraw his consent.
Respectfully subn1itted,
REGNAL "\V. GARFF, JR.
Attorney for Respondent
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